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INTRODUCTION
The Incompatibility of International
Accommodation and Private Attorneys General
by Joseph P. Griffin*
H armonization of conflicting national laws and supranational enforce-
ment of internationally agreed upon norms are the most frequently
mentioned long-term solutions to the present international disputes con-
cerning enforcement of the U.S. antitrust laws. The articles by Mrs.
Korah and Mr. Sauermilch in this issue of the Journal are sobering re-
minders of the considerable difficulties that arise even after nations have
agreed on norms and enforcement procedures. In the very different con-
texts of the free movements of goods within the European Common Mar-
ket and Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the
authors note the importance of pragmatism, flexibility, and accommoda-
tion in the successful operation of supranational organizations. The arti-
cle by Prof. Matsushita and Mr. Repeta is an illuminating case study of
the accommodation reached by Japan and the United States regarding
exports of Japanese automobiles to the United States. This accommoda-
tion was accomplished despite the lack of an international consensus on
the basis for jurisdiction in antitrust cases, substantive antitrust stan-
dards, and the parameters of the foreign sovereign compulsion defense.
The authors emphasize that one of the principal reasons for this accom-
modation is the existence of what the authors describe as "fearsome crea-
tures." The same creatures have been characterized as "rogue elephants"
by the Deputy Secretary of the United Kingdom's Department of Trade.1
These "fearsome rogue elephants" are private antitrust plaintiffs.
* Partner, Wald, Harkrader & Ross, Washington, D.C. and London: Chairman, Com-
mittee on International Aspects of Antitrust Law of ABA's Section of International Law;
Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center; Diploma in Law, Oxford University;,
J.D., Georgetown; B.A., University of Virginia.
I Remarks on "Nationality and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: U.S. Law Abroad" by
W. M. Knighton, before the International Law Institute of Georgetown University Law
Center (Aug. 13, 1981).
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In a number of recent U.S. antitrust cases the executive branch of
the U.S. Government averted or minimized a confrontation with foreign
governments over enforcement of the U.S. antitrust laws only to see the
accommodation endangered or destroyed by private treble damage ac-
tions. For example, after a lengthy investigation and many consultations
with foreign governments, the Department of Justice decided that the
best way to resolve the uranium cartel controversy was to issue a com-
plaint against a single U.S. firm - Gulf Oil Company.2 Subsequently, pri-
vate treble damage suits were filed by several U.S. firms that enraged at
least four of the closest allies of the United States: Australia, Canada,
France, and the United Kingdom.8 In response, each of those countries
enacted some type of "blocking," "anti-enforcement," or "clawback" stat-
ute,4 and the Commonwealth Law Ministers called for nonrecognition of
U.S. antitrust treble damage judgments.5 Similarly, despite the clear pres-
ence of prescriptive jurisdiction under U.S. law and prima facie evidence
of an antitrust violation, the Department of Justice took no action against
OPEC or its member nations for their oil price fixing and supply restrict-
ing activities. Nevertheless, a private plaintiff initiated a treble damage
action which the courts eventually dismissed.6 The impact on U.S. foreign
policy and the U.S. economy had OPEC retailiated against the United
States in the event such private suits had been successfully prosecuted is
difficult to overestimate.
The carefully choreographed minuet by the Japanese and U.S. Gov-
ernments regarding exports to Japanese automobiles was intended to
minimize the likelihood of a successful private challenge to the "unilat-
eral" action by the Japanese Government. The Governments clearly
2 United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., [1970-79 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
45,078, at 53,722 (W.D. Pa. June 2, 1978). See also Confirmation Hearings on John H.
Shenefield, Nominee, Associate Attorney General Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 96th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1979-80).
3 See In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980), af'g in part 473 F.
Supp. 382 (N.D. I1. 1979). See also In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts
Litig., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 93 N.M.
105, 597 P.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 911 (1980); Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R. 434. For background see PERSPECTIVES ON THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS (J. Griffin ed. 1979);
Pikna, The Uranium Cartel Saga, 12 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 591 (1980).
' See e.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, ch. 11; Foreign Antitrust Judg-
ments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act of 1979, No. 13, Austl. Acts P., 1979; Uranium In-
formation Security Regulations, Can. Stat. 0. & Regs. ch. 366 (1977); French Law No. 80-
538 (1980), reprinted in Toms, French Response to the Extraterritorial Application of the
United States Antitrust Laws, 15 INT'L LAW. 585, 609 (English trans. at 611) (1981).
1 Comminique of the Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers, Barbados, 29 April to
2 May, 1980.
6 Int'l Assn. of Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), alI'd, 649 F.2d
1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
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hoped to avoid the near brush with antitrust disaster that occurred in the
Consumers Union case7 which involved "voluntary" Japanese restraints
of steel exports.
Foreign governments assert that it is very difficult to avoid confron-
tations with the United States over antitrust enforcement when the U.S.
Government is unable to guarantee that a particular international accom-
modation will not be ignored by a private plaintiff, especially when that
plaintiff may prosecute successfully a lawsuit in the United States that
will jeopardize substantial foreign interests and U.S. foreign relations.,
There are several possible solutions to this problem. The Attorney
General or the President could be given the power to terminate a private
action if it endangered significant national interests. Treble damages
could be reduced to single damages or eliminated in foreign commerce
cases. Private plaintiffs could be given a right of action against the U.S.
Government in cases where they had been injured but where foreign pol-
icy considerations were deemed to be sufficient to preclude a private suit.
Such solutions probably are not yet politically feasible. The suspicion of
governmental claims of overriding national interest and the concept of
private attorneys general are deeply rooted in American politics. Hope-
fully, as international economic interdependence increases and citizens as
well as legislators become more aware of the issues, the United States will
be able to reevaluate the concept of private treble damage suits in foreign
commerce cases and find a solution that is fair to injured Americans while
it preserves often fragile international accommodations.
Consumers Union v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd sub. nom. Con-
sumers Union v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
8 See, e.g., Comments of Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxer and Kingman
Brewster, Jr. in Current Issues in International Antitrust: Sept. 29, 1981 A Panel Discussion
(J. Griffin ed. 1981).
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